Could Russia's ‘Sovereign Internet’ go international?

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Friends and foes of internet freedom are watching Russia closely.

 

Last November, Moscow's “Sovereign Internet” bill came into force . This series of amendments allow the Russian authorities to sever the RuNet — Russia's section of the internet — from the global network in hazily defined times of crisis, giving them control over in- and outward bound flows of data. It also mandates internet service providers to provide the state greater monitoring capacities over internet traffic, and calls for the creation of a national domain name system.

 

Since the law's implementation, analysts worldwide have been attempting to make sense of the Kremlin's long term strategy for digital policy. In January 2020, Alena Epifanova, a researcher at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), published a widely discussed paper considering how the move would “accelerate splinternets” globally. The term ”splinternet” is used by experts to describe the splintering of the internet along geographic and commercial boundaries (also sometimes referred to as the ”internet balkanisation”.)

 

Epifanova's paper provides the first insight into how Russia's “Sovereign Internet” drive fits into international trends — and wonders whether Moscow might set a precedent if the move proves successful.

 

I spoke with Epifanova after a panel discussion on digital rights in Russia in Berlin on February 20. The interview has been edited for length and clarity.

 

Maxim Edwards:  Your report was the first to stress the international dimension of Russia’s Sovereign Internet initiative. If, as you say, other authoritarian regimes might be watching closely, could there be a diffusion of digital authoritarianism if Moscow succeeds with this experiment? What countries could be the most at risk?

 

Alena Epifanova:

 

 I think this is one of the goals of the so-called sovereign internet law: to make the Kremlin’s call for state-centred internet governance more concrete and vocal. This is not just about state control of the flow of information within the country, which of course could be attractive to other authoritarian states. If Russia’s model of relatively low cost surveillance (in comparison to the Chinese one) works out, it could serve as a precedent and be adopted by other authoritarian regimes in order to strengthen their power and weaken democratic forces. It's also about a possible alternative model for internet governance. By passing this law and trying to implement the sovereign internet, Russia is putting into question the existing multi-stakeholder model and institutions such as ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), thereby actively promoting a state-centred form of internet governance. Russia is not seeking to isolate itself from the rest of the world, but rather to create a precedent which other states aspiring to sovereignty over their segments of the internet can follow.

 

I think the Central Asian republics could become “digital allies” for Moscow. Russia still has influence in the more illiberal republics of the post-Soviet space and is linking its Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) with Chinese’s Belt and Roads Initiative (BRI) in the region. Russia also provides expertise and technical assistance to these countries in the framework of the Shanghai Coordination Organization (SCO). Russia is also interested in establishing a parallel network and building the core of an alternative model of internet governance with BRICS countries. In November 2017, Russia’s Security Council proposed a separate internet infrastructure with its own DNS root server system for the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), independent from ICANN. It is still unclear whether Russia will manage to convince other countries to use this alternative. But they certainly could be interested in having a greater stake in the state-centred model of internet governance. In the long term, such “networked authoritarianism” could lead to the fracturing of the global internet and a shift in power and in stakeholders.    

 

ME:

 

What risk would a successful “Sovereign Internet” pose to comparatively democratic societies, such as the EU and the U.S.? After all, it’s no secret that not only authoritarian regimes want to constrain digital freedoms.

 

AE: 

 

Despite some internet control laws in UK or Germany (e.g. the Investigatory Powers Act of 2016 and the Network Enforcement Act of 2017), they simply cannot be compared to the extent of Russia’s comprehensive and targeted approach towards internet freedom. Nevertheless, Russia is offering an alternative vision of managing digital space in the post-Snowden era. Its success could lead to the wrongful belief that growing state control is a necessary element of sovereignty per se. This could strengthen supporters of more control over the internet, leading to further restriction of digital rights.

 

ME:

 

You suggest that Russia will collaborate more closely with China in the field of digital governance. I wonder whether we could already speak of a growing Russian dependency on Beijing — which is far more technologically advanced than Moscow. What risks could this partnership pose to Russian netizens?

 

AE: 

 

Russia’s ambitious internet policy could require closer cooperation with China, as Russia is diverging from its western partners and criticising the existing model of internet governance. At the same time, Russia needs technology and resources to build its sovereign internet. Russia and China have had several high level meetings on cybersecurity and internet control; there is a contract between Huawei and (mobile network operator) MTS to develop Russia’s 5G network, and both countries promote the idea of state sovereignty in cyberspace on the international level. Russia's new technocratic government might need to show results quickly and could benefit from China’s experience in internet regulation and surveillance as well as technology by adopting them in Russia. However, it is still unclear if the security issue will be neglected for the sake of fast implementation, which could lead to a conflict between Russia’s security services and the government.

 

It is difficult to say whether there is a growing Russian dependency on Beijing, or what risks this partnership poses to Russian netizens. Very little information is available about the practical aspects of this cooperation. One can read a lot of proclamations about the strategic partnership and about meetings between the two countries’ presidents, but very little about its concrete implementation and results. I would say that for now it is still unclear that Russia will rely on Chinese technology. At the same time, I am not sure Russia will be able to develop its own technology. In the long term, Russia will need to decide which of the two IT technology giants it will choose: China or the USA.    

 

ME:

 

Much of the Sovereign Internet law is technically ambitious if not infeasible — for now. But it does create a legal framework for further shutdowns and surveillance. What is to stop this going the way of, say, the Yarovaya Laws of 2018 (allowing greater scrutiny of users’ communications in the name of counter-terrorism) — a bold statement of intent which is too expensive and tricky to realise?

 

AE: 

 

The internet has a strategic dimension for the current Russian regime, so I think the Kremlin will try if not to fully implement the sovereign internet law, then at least to gain greater state control over the internet's infrastructure and the flow of data within Russia’s borders. I think there will be a pragmatic and selective approach which will make digital actors cooperate with the Russian state on the state’s terms: negotiating and making the most of the situation (e.g. for example, the implementation of the data localisation law)

 

ME:

 

Russia may not be able to take on the big Western digital giants immediately. But these mounting regulations could become so cumbersome that, in the long term, they hurt business opportunities. What are the long term consequences of the Sovereign Internet law for foreign digital companies operating in Russia?

 

AE: 

 

In the framework of the law, deep packet inspection (DPI) or similar technologies should be installed on the networks of internet server providers. Among other functions, DPI can be used to prioritise and select certain traffic, so a state authority managing the internet in Russia could slow down the traffic speed of all undesired connections and prioritise others. This could compromise net neutrality and lead to discrimination against companies not protected by the Russian state. The risk I see is that there will be only one regulator, the state communications watchdog Roskomnadzor, which means more room for manoeuvre and less control of implementation. With this and other internet laws, Russia is trying to subordinate the existing rules to national regulations. In parallel, the Russian government gives preferential treatment to big Russian internet companies. That means that the market in Russia is becoming more unpredictable and less secure for foreign companies. 

 

ME:

 

You said at a recent panel discussion that the best response to the “Sovereign Internet” is for supporters of digital rights worldwide to “explain their own vision of a sovereign, and democratic, internet in contrast to the Russian model.” What might that look like?

 

AE: 

 

There should be a broad public discussion about the future of the internet, internet literacy, and human rights in the digital age — both within countries as between stakeholders who promote the economic and political advantages of a free and global internet. The legitimacy of ICANN should be reinforced, the United Nations’ Internet Governance Forum should receive more support, wider recognition and influence. Standards for transnational legal regulations in cyberspace should be developed by a broad coalition of countries, businesses, tech companies, and civil society.

 

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